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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Jonathan W. Ellington appeals from the district court's order denying his 
motion for a new trial. 
Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings 
The state previously described the underlying fact~ as follows: 1 
At 3:30 [a.m.], Ellington got in a disagreement with his live-in 
girlfriend and drove his Chevy Blazer, which had no license plates, 
to Ronald Cunningham's house on Sacrcello Road to drink beer 
and watch TV. Ellington arrived at his friend's residence at 6:00 
[a.m.]. Upon leaving the Cunningham residence in his Blazer, 
Ellington ended up behind a white Honda. The occupants of the 
Honda were two girls: Javon and Joleen Larsen. Javon was 22 
years old and Joleen was 18. Javon was taking Joleen back to her 
parents' home. 
Ellington appeared upset that the Honda was driving slow 
and he was unable to pass her because of an on-coming vehicle. 
After the on-coming vehicle passed, Ellington sped-up, passed the 
Honda, and then stopped at the next intersection. Ellington got out 
of the Blazer, approached the car, swore at Javon and Joleen, 
challenged them to a fight, and punched the Honda's window on 
the driver's side. The girls called 911 and, not being able to give a 
license description to the 911 operator, followed Ellington. 
Ellington, aware that the girls were following him and believing that 
the girls had or were going to call the police, drove past his home 
and turned around. After turning around, Ellington drove his vehicle 
in the wrong lane directly at the girls, swerving at the last instant 
into the other lane. Ellington was ultimately able to lose the girls 
who were still on the phone with the 911 operator. After losing 
sight of Ellington, the girls waited for an officer from the sheriff's 
department. During this time the 911 call ended and the girls called 
their parents, Joel and Vonette Larsen. A sheriffs deputy arrived, 
gave them a witness statement form to fill out, and left to 
investigate. The girls' parents, driving a maroon Subaru, also 
arrived at the location. They also left to look for the Blazer. 
1 Ellington's retrial established substantially similar facts. (See generally Trial Tr.) 
1 
After losing the girls, Ellington returned to his home where 
he got in yet another disagreement with his girlfriend. After 
Ellington's girlfriend left to go to a friend's house, Ellington got back 
in his Blazer and drove back by the location where Javon and 
Joleen [were filling] out their police paperwork. Ellington flipped 
them off as he passed them. The two girls got back on the phone 
with the 911 operator to inform the police that Ellington was back 
on the road and that they were following Ellington a second time --
this time with their parents following close behind. 
Ellington was traveling at very high speeds driving back 
toward the residence on Scarcello Road where he had been earlier. 
Ellington drove past the residence around a curve and then turned 
around. The girls stopped their Honda in front of Ellington's Blazer; 
the girls' parents pulled up in front of the Honda in the Subaru. As 
the Subaru was coming to a stop, Ellington drove around the 
driver's side of the Subaru, clipped it with the side of his vehicle, 
and rammed the Honda with Joleen and Javon inside --
accelerating and driving the Honda across the road approximately 
forty-five feet until the car's wheels furrowed in the dirt. The girls' 
mother, Vonette Larsen, got out of the vehicle and ran in the 
direction of the Honda. Joel Larsen also exited the vehicle and 
removed a handgun that was in the vehicle. Joel also ran to where 
the Blazer had rammed the Honda. Joel Larson never made it to 
the Honda. Ellington, after pushing the Honda all the way across 
the road, reversed the Blazer back on the road. Ellington made a 
hard left and accelerated toward Vonette Larsen who was still 
running to the Honda. As the Blazer traveled toward Vonette 
Larsen, in an attempt to stop the Blazer from hitting his wife, Joel 
Larsen shot the passenger side front panel of the Blazer. The shot 
had no effect on the path of the vehicle. Ellington hit Vonette 
Larsen with his Blazer causing her body to come down on the hood 
of the Blazer and then to the ground where she was ultimately run 
over and killed. The entire incident was recorded by the 911 
operator who was on the phone with Joleen Larsen. 
After Ellington ran over Vonette Larsen, he left the scene 
and returned to the Cunningham residence. Ellington went inside 
where he continued to drink and watched football on the television. 
Law enforcement eventually located his Blazer at the residence and 
subsequently placed Ellington under arrest. 
(#338432 Appellant's Brief, pp.1-4 (citations omitted)). 
2 Ellington's August 14, 2013 motion to take judicial notice of the record in 
Ellington's prior appeal, #33843, remains pending before the Court. 
2 
The state charged Ellington with second-degree murder for running over 
and killing Vonette Larsen with his Blazer, and two counts of aggravated battery 
for striking the Larsen daughters' Honda. (#33843 R., Vol. /, pp.127-129.) After 
a trial, the jury found Ellington guilty of each charge. (#33843 R. Vol. II, pp.379-
380.) The district court also denied Ellington's motion for a new trial. (#33843 
Supp. R., pp.32-46.) 
On appeal, the Idaho Supreme Court vacated Ellington's convictions and 
remanded the case for a new trial. State v. Ellington, 151 Idaho 53, 253 P.3d 
727 (2011) (hereinafter "Ellington I"). Specifically, the Court identified instances 
of prosecutorial misconduct and evidentiary error, and held that the district court 
abused its discretion by not granting Ellington's motion for a new trial on the 
basis of newly discovered evidence that state rebuttal witness Fred Rice testified 
inconsistently with his prior testimony in another case, and with training materials 
he authored. lsi. 
The state retried Ellington, and the jury once again found Ellington guilty of 
second-degree murder and both counts of aggravated battery. (R., pp.539-540.) 
The district court imposed a unified 18-year sentence with 10 years fixed for 
second-degree murder, and concurrent lesser sentences on the aggravated 
battery charges. (R., pp.673-675.) 
Ellington again made a motion for a new trial on several grounds. (R., 
pp.544-546; R. Ex., pp.830-869.) Relevant to this appeal, Ellington asserted that 
he was entitled to a new trial based on a claim of newly discovered evidence that 
state accident reconstruction expert witness John Daily testified inconsistently 
3 
with a previously-published textbook that he authored. (R. Ex., pp.865-868.) 
The district court rejected each of Ellington's claims and denied his motion for 
new trial. (R., pp.821-840.) With respect to Ellington's "new evidence" claim, the 
district court concluded that Ellington failed to satisfy any of the four prongs of the 
controlling Drapeau3 standard. (R. Ex., pp.836-839.) Ellington timely appealed. 
(3/26/12 Notice of Appeal; see also R., p.29.) 
3 State v. Drapeau, 97 Idaho 685, 551 P.2d 972 (1976). 
4 
ISSUE 
Ellington states the issue on appeal as: 
Did the district court err in denying Mr. Ellington's motion for a new 
trial where there was newly-discovered evidence showing that the 
State's retained accident reconstruction expert testified falsely at 
Mr. Ellington's trial? 
(Appel/ant's brief, p.22.) 
The state wishes to rephrase the issue on appeal as: 
Has Ellington failed to show that the district court abused its discretion in 
denying his motion for a new trial? 
5 
ARGUMENT 
Ellington Has Failed To Show That The District Court Abused Its Discretion By 
Denying His Motion For A New Trial 
A. Introduction 
Ellington contends that the district court abused its discretion in denying 
his motion for a new trial. (See generally Appellant's brief.) Specifically, 
Ellington contends that the district court erred in concluding that he failed to meet 
any of the prongs of the controlling Drapeau standard with regard to his proposed 
"new evidence" consisting of excerpts from a textbook authored by state expert 
witness John Daily. (JgJ 
Because Ellington has failed to show that these excerpts: (1) were 
unknown to him at the time of trial; (2) could not have been discovered with due 
'diligence; (3) were material to his guilt or innocence, and not merely impeaching 
or cumulative; and (4) would probably have produced an acquittal, Ellington has 
failed to show that the district court abused its discretion in denying his motion for 
a new trial. 
B. Standard Of Review 
Granting or denying a motion for a new trial is within the district court's 
discretion and will not be disturbed on appeal unless that discretion is abused. 
State v. Jones, 127 Idaho 478, 481, 903 P.2d 67, 70 (1995); State v. Pugsley, 
119 Idaho 62,63,803 P.2d 563,564 (Ct. App. 1991). 
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C. Ellington Has Shown No Abuse of Discretion In The District Court's 
Application Of The Drapeau Standard 
A defendant may obtain. a new trial "[w]hen new evidence is discovered 
material to the defendant, and which he could not with reasonable diligence have 
discovered and produced at the triaL" I.C. § 19-2406(7). In State v. Drapeau, 97 
Idaho 685, 551 P.2d 972 (1976), the Idaho Supreme Court articulated the four-
part test a defendant must satisfy in order to be entitled to a new trial based upon 
newly discovered evidence. That test requires a defendant to show that the 
evidence offered in support of his motion for a new trial (1) is newly discovered 
and was unknown to the defendant at the time of trial; (2) is material, not merely 
cumulative or impeaching; (3) will probably produce an acquittal; and (4) failure 
to learn of the evidence was due to no lack of diligence on the part of the 
defendant. kL at 691, 551 P.2d at 978; see also Grube v. State, 134 Idaho 24, 
30,995 P.2d 794,800 (2000). 
In announcing this four-part test, the Court cited Professor Wright's text on 
Federal Practice and Procedure and specifically noted his comment, "after a man 
has had his day in court, and has been fairly tried, there is a proper reluctance to 
give him a second triaL" Drapeau, 97 Idaho at 691, 551 P.2d at 978 (citation 
omitted). "Motions for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence are 
disfavored and should be granted with caution, reflecting the importance 
accorded to considerations of repose, regularity of decision making, and 
conservation of scarce judicial resources." State v. Stevens, 146 Idaho 139, 144, 
191 P.3d 217, 222 (2008) (internal quotations and citations omitted) (quoting 
State v. Hayes, 144 Idaho 574,577, 165 P.3d 288, 291 (Ct. App. 2007». 
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In this case, Ellington's asserted "new evidence" concerns a portion of the 
testimony of state expert accident reconstruction witness John Daily. (R. Ex., 
pp.865-868.) At trial, Daily testified that his review of the incident indicated that 
the impact between Ellington's Blazer and the Subaru occupied by Joel and 
Vonette Larsen was relatively insignificant, and thus could not have caused the 
Blazer to rotate to such a substantial degree as to cause it to face in the direction 
of the Larsen daughters' Honda, which the Blazer subsequently stuck. (Trial Tr., 
Vol. II, p.863, LA - p.928, L.17.) The implication of this opinion was that 
Ellington must have actively turned the steering wheel and accelerated in such a 
manner as to intentionally strike the Larsen daughters' Honda following his 
impact with the Subaru. Daily supported this opinion by describing his 
observations of damage on the impacted vehicles and visible tire marks. (ld.) 
He also referenced a calculation he conducted utilizing a rotational mechanics 
formula. (Trial Tr., Vol. II, p.891, L.15 - p.892, L.24.) Pursuant to this formula, 
an impact causing the Blazer to rotate by the required 45 degrees to put it on a 
collision course with the Honda "would require a speed change on the part of a 
Subaru of about 41 to 42 miles an hour." (Id.) Daily testified that such a speed 
change would have resulted in more extensive vehicle damage than he 
observed. (Trial Tr., Vol. II, p.892, L.21 - p.893, L.6.) In a supplemental report 
prepared shortly prior to trial, Daily identified the rotational mechanics formula he 
utilized as W = -V2FhO/I. (R. Ex., pp.767-771.) 
In his motion for a new trial, Ellington argued thi?t following his retrial, he 
discovered "new evidence" in the form of a previously-published textbook 
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authored by Daily, which, Ellington asserts, contains an excerpt that 
recommends against the use of the rotational mechanics formula utilized by Daily 
to analyze accidents where the impact is less than 45 degrees, as was the case 
in the BlazerlSubaru impact, according to Daily's testimony. (R. Ex., pp.865-
868.) 
Ellington's challenge fails because the district court properly exercised its 
discretion in concluding that Ellington failed to satisfy any of the four prongs of 
the controlling Drapeau standard. Additionally, Ellington's attempts to draw 
parallels between this case and Ellington I are misguided. First, Ellington has 
made no allegation that Daily has committed perjury (see Appellant's brief, p.24 
n.21), and thus, some of the specific concerns expressed by the Idaho Supreme 
Court in Ellington I, as well as the Court's modifications to the Drapeau standard 
(which the Court held apply in instances of state witness perjury), are not 
applicable in this case. Second, unlike in Ellington I, Ellington did not himself 
present any expert witness testimony during retrial to attempt to establish any 
particular defense theory. Instead, Ellington's proposed "new evidence" has the 
sole purpose of attempting to attack and impeach the state's expert and theory of 
the case. Finally, unlike in Ellington I, the existence of the proposed "newly 
discovered evidence" had actually been disclosed to Ellington prior to his retrial. 
For these reasons, Ellington has failed to show that he is entitled to a new trial. 
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1. The Prooosed Evidence Was Not Newly Discovered Or Unknown 
To Ellington At The Time Of Trial 
The first prong of the Drapeau standard requires a defendant seeking a 
new trial on the grounds of newly discovered evidence to show that the evidence 
was newly discovered or unknown to him at the time of trial. Drapeau, 97 at 691, 
551 P.2d at 978. The district court correctly utilized its discretion to find that 
Ellington failed to satisfy this prong, noting that the state disclosed the existence 
of the textbook in question to Ellington prior to trial. (R., p.837.) 
The curriculum vitae of Daily, which Ellington does not dispute was 
properly disclosed to the defense prior to trial, referenced the textbook in 
question, Fundamentals of Traffic Crash Reconstruction. (R. Ex., p.688.) The 
state submits that evidence that is properly disclosed to the defense prior to trial 
may never constitute evidence "unknown to the defendant at the time of trial" for 
purposes of a Drapeau analysis. If Ellington believes this disclosed evidence 
was not properly examined or utilized by his trial counsel and retained defense 
experts prior to his trial and conviction, he may raise a post-conviction ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim, but he may not legitimately claim the evidence was 
unknown to him at the time of trial. 
Further, even if properly disclosed evidence can be characterized as being 
"unknown to the defendant at the time of trial," for the purpose of the first 
Drapeau prong, the state additionally asserts that the type of evidence proposed 
in this case - previously published scholarship material - cannot generally 
constitute "new evidence" for the purposes of a motion for a new trial where there 
is no assertion of perjury. In trials containing expert testimony regarding complex 
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concepts such as accident reconstruction, parties would often have the ability, 
post-trial, and with the benefit of hindsight, to identify already-existing scholarship 
relating to trial issues. Such available scholarship would, in many instances, 
permit a defendant to move for a new trial in the hopes of presenting a more 
tailored cross-examination, or an entirely new defense theory (perhaps to replace 
a previously unsuccessful one). Ellington I did not invite such a practice, nor 
does any other legal authority. 
Daily's previously-published textbook, which the state disclosed the 
existence of prior to trial, cannot constitute evidence "unknown" to Ellington at the 
time of trial. Ellington has therefore failed to show that the district court abused 
its discretion in concluding that Ellington failed to satisfy the first Drapeau prong. 
2. Ellington's Failure To Learn Of The Proposed Evidence Prior To 
Trial Was Due To His Own Lack Of Due Diligence 
The next prong of the Drapeau standard requires a defendant seeking a 
new trial on the grounds of newly discovered evidence to show that his failure to 
learn of the evidence prior to trial was not due to his own lack of due diligence. 
Drapeau, 97 at 691, 551 P.2d at 97. The district court properly utilized its 
discretion in concluding that Ellington failed to satisfy this prong. (R., p.839). 
On appeal, Ellington asserts that his failure to learn of the relevant 
excerpts of the disclosed textbook prior to trial was not due to a lack of due 
diligence. (Appellant's brief, pp.26-30.) Specifically, Ellington contends that he 
could not be reasonably expected to know the contents of the sizable amount of 
publications disclosed to him through Daily's curriculum vitae, and that it was not 
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until it reviewed Daily's supplemental report after the retrial commenced4 that the 
defense had any reason to delve into Daily's written materials concerning 
rotational mechanics. (Id.) Ellington's contentions fail for several reasons. 
First, it was clear prior to trial, and prior to the preparation of Daily's 
supplemental accident reconstruction report, that the impact of the BlazerlSubaru 
collision on the subsequent movement of the Blazer would be an issue at trial. 
Daily's initial reconstruction report, which was completed well in advance of trial, 
stated that the BlazerlSubaru impact was relatively insignificant, caused only 
"minor damage to both vehicles," that it was "unlikely there was any redirection 
from this impact," and that following this collision, Ellington "turned to the left, 
even though the eastbound lane was open to him, and continued to accelerate 
towards the Honda Accord containing the Larsen Sisters." (R. Ex., p.705.) 
Ellington's retained defense expert David Rochford, whom Ellington elected not 
to call as a witness at trial, completed his own accident reconstruction report, in 
which he concluded that "[t]he force of the impact form the Subaru changed the 
Blazer's direction of travel from southeast before impact to northeast after 
impact." (R. Ex., p.800; see also Appellant's brief, pp.9-10.) During his opening 
4 Daily's supplemental report is dated January 15, 2012, which is three days prior 
to the start of the retrial. (R. Ex., p.767; Trial Tr., Vol. I.) However, it is unclear 
from the appellate record when the state actually disclosed Daily's supplemental 
report. In his appellant's brief, Ellington asserts that the report was not disclosed 
to the defense until after the retrial began. (Appellant's brief, p.11.) However, in 
support of this assertion, Ellington cites only his own motion for a new trial, which 
contains an unsupported conclusory statement about the timing of the disclosure 
(R. Ex., p.867), and a portion of the transcript of the hearing on the motion for a 
new trial, in which defense expert David Rochford testified merely that he had not 
reviewed the supplemental report until the start of the retrial. (4/24/12 Tr., p.8, 
L.24 - p.9, L.11). 
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statement, Ellington's attorney referenced the impact of the BlazerlSubaru 
collision on the Blazer's subsequent movements. (Trial Tr., Vol. I, p.349, L.23 -
p.350, L.2) ("[H]e tried to get back on this side, going back into the proper lane of 
traffic, but the Subaru rammed him from the driver's door right in front. That 
spins him, he comes out, he's flooring it, and he hits the Honda.") Due diligence 
required Ellington to be familiar with the portions of the disclosed material 
relevant to the Blazer's post-impact rotation. 
Further, Ellington's trial tactics demonstrated a lack of due diligence in 
recognizing the state's theory of the case and the significance of the disclosed 
evidence, and a lack of any attempt to pursue remedies available before or 
during trial to help him utilize the disclosed evidence and respond to Daily's 
testimony. Ellington apparently did not move for a continuance on the ground 
that he needed time to review Daily's supplemental accident reconstruction 
report, which referenced the rotational mechanics formula in question.5 In 
addition, Ellington did not ask for a continuance during or following Daily's 
testimony, or object to the testimony as beyond the scope of required pretrial 
disclosures. (See Trial Tr., Vol. II, p.849, L.5 - p.928, L.22.) Finally, Ellington 
made the tactical decision to replace his originally retained accident 
reconstruction expert shortly before the second trial, apparently because that 
expert had been recently retained by the state in a separate criminal case. (See 
5 Ellington did move for a continuance immediately before trial, but on the 
grounds of late police disclosure of notes concerning palm prints from the hood 
of Ellington's Blazer, and to pursue an interlocutory appeal from the district 
court's order denying Ellington's motion to dismiss. (Trial Tr., Vol. I, p.18, L.13 -
p. 19, L.13.) 
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Appellant's brief, p.8 n.?) Ellington's newly-retained expert may have been 
unfamiliar with Daily's prior publications, and ill-prepared to assist Ellington's 
defense in challenging Daily's testimony. 
Ellington has also failed to support his apparent contention that where 
evidentiary rules require the state to disclose the existence of a voluminous 
amount of information, the defense should essentially have the opportunity to 
complete its review of these disclosures after the trial is over. At the very least, 
it is reasonable to expect a defendant exercising due diligence to review a state 
expert witnesses' qualifications and publications relevant to their expected 
testimony prior to trial and/or to retain defense counsel capable of doing so. 
Ellington's arguments illustrate some of the inherent issues related to an 
application of the Drapeau standard to "newly discovered evidence" of this 
nature. Where the state presents expert testimony to support its theory of the 
case, the defendant has the opportunity to retain his own expert to support a 
meaningful challenge to the state's expert and its theory of the case, or to 
develop his own alternative theory. Where the defendant reviews, only after 
trial, previously-published and disclosed material that, upon hindsight, possibly 
could have been utilized by the defense to impeach the state's expert, or to 
develop and present an alternative defense theory, the state asserts that such 
"evidence" may not generally satisfy the due diligence prong of the Drapeau 
standard. Instead, the essence of Ellington's challenge is that his trial attorney 
should have more thoroughly prepared for, or challenged the admission of, 
Daily's testimony, or sought a continuance to better prepare for it, or retained a 
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more competent expert witness in a relevant field. Such a chailenge is better 
suited for a post-conviction ineffective assistance of counsel claim. 
Even if the previously disclosed and published textbook could constitute 
evidence "unknown" to Ellington at the time of trial, Ellington cannot show that 
the district court abused its discretion in concluding that he failed to utilize due 
diligence to learn of the relevant excerpts from the textbook. Ellington has 
therefore failed to show that the district court abused its discretion in concluding 
that Ellington failed to satisfy this prong of the Drapeau standard. 
3. The Proposed Evidence Is Merely Impeaching, And Not Material 
The next prong of the Drapeau standard requires a defendant seeking a 
new trial on the grounds of newly discovered evidence to show that the proposed 
evidence is material to his guilt or innocence, and is not merely impeaching. 
Drapeau, 97 at 691, 551 P.2d at 978. Evidence may be both material and 
impeaching. Ellington I, 151 Idaho at 74, 253 P.3d at 748. The Idaho Court of 
Appeals has described the difference between impeachment evidence and 
substantive evidence as follows: 
Unlike substantive evidence which is offered for the purpose 
of persuading the trier of fact as to the truth of a proposition on 
which the determination of the tribunal is to be asked, impeachment 
is that which is designed to discredit a witness, i.e. to reduce the 
effectiveness of his testimony by bringing forth the evidence which 
explains why the jury should not put faith in him or his testimony. 
State v. Marsh, 141 Idaho 862,868-69,119 P.3d 637,643-44 (Ct. App. 2004). 
In this case, the district court properly utilized its discretion in concluding 
that Ellington failed to satisfy this prong. (R., pp.837-838). 
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Evidence asserting that Daily may have incorrectly utilized a rotational 
mechanics formula in reaching his conclusions was not materially supportive of 
Ellington's guilt or innocence, or of any alternative defense theory or expert 
testimony presented at trial. In fact, as the district court recognized (R., p.837), 
Ellington presented no expert testimony at his second trial, and thus offered no 
supported alternative defense theory regarding the impact of the BlazerlSubaru 
collision on the Blazer's subsequent movements. Nor did Ellington attempt to 
utilize the content of Daily's textbook to re-calculate the impact of the 
Honda/Subaru collision to support an alternative theory in the context of his 
motion for a new trial. Instead, Ellington offered the textbook excerpts only to 
attack Daily's testimony, i.e., as impeachment evidence. 
In this sense, Ellington's motion for a new trial is distinguishable from the 
one analyzed by the Idaho Supreme Court following Ellington's first trial. In 
Ellington I, the Idaho Supreme Court held that evidence that Fred Rice testified 
inconsistently with both his prior testimony and authored training materials was 
both impeaching and materially substantive, because not only could it have been 
used to impeach Rice's trial testimony, but it was also supportive of Ellington's 
defense theory regarding reaction times, as presented by his own expert witness 
at trial. Ellington I, 151 Idaho at 73-74, 253 P.3d at 747-748. In the retrial 
however, Ellington's attacks on Daily's testimony supported no alternative expert-
supported theory. 
Excerpts from Daily's textbook which Ellington asserts demonstrate that 
Daily incorrectly utilized a formula in preparing his accident reconstruction 
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reports, if introduced at trial, would merely be impeaching, and not material. 
Therefore, Ellington has failed to show that the district court abused its discretion 
in concluding that he failed to satisfy the corresponding prong of the Drapeau 
standard. 
4. The Proposed Evidence Would Not Probably Have Produced An 
Acquittal 
The next prong of the Drapeau standard requires a defendant seeking a 
new trial on the grounds of newly discovered evidence to show that the proposed 
evidence would have "probably" produced an acquittal if admitted at trial. 
Drapeau, 97 at 691, 551 P.2d at 978. In this case, the district court properly 
utilized its discretion in concluding that Ellington failed to make such a showing. 
(R., pp.838-839). 
At the outset, and as the district court recognized (R., p.838), it is clear 
that any evidence relating to the Blazer's movements immediately following its 
impact with the Subaru was relevant only to the two aggravated battery charges, 
which were based upon the Blazer's subsequent contact with the Honda 
occupied by the Larsen sisters. Such evidence has no bearing on the second-
degree murder charge, which was based upon the Blazer's later contact with 
Vonette Larson. Following its impact with the Subaru, the Blazer struck the 
Honda and pushed it back 48 feet over some period of time. (R. Ex. pp.672, 705; 
see generally Trial Tr.) It was only after disengaging from the Honda, backing 
up, and then traveling forward again, did the Blazer then strike Vonette Larsen. 
(R. Ex. pp.672, 705; see generally Trial Tr.) Therefore, any evidence relating to 
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the Blazer's rotation (or lack thereof) following the Subaru impact, and whether or 
not Ellington had to actively turn the Blazer in order to subsequently engage in a 
collision course with the Honda, is irrelevant to a determination of his later intent 
in striking Vonette Larsen. Even if this Court determines that Ellington has 
satisfied each of the four Drapeu prongs with regard to the proposed "new 
evidence" of the textbook excerpts, it should remand this case for a new trial only 
upon the two aggravated battery charges. In any event, Ellington cannot show 
that the admission of the textbook excerpts would have probably produced an 
acquittal even on the two aggravated battery charges. 
First, Ellington has failed to demonstrate that Daily's trial testimony was 
actually inconsistent with the textbook excerpts. At trial, Daily testified that the 
BlazerlSubaru collision would have had to rotate the Blazer 45 degrees in order 
to put it on a direct collision course with the Honda. (Trial Tr., Vol. II, p.891, L.22-
p.892, L.3.) For this to occur, Daily testified, "it would require a speed change on 
the part of the Subaru of about 41 to 42 miles an hour." (Trial Tr., Vol. II, p.892, 
Ls.14-20.) Daily calculated this "41 to 42 miles an hour" based on principles of 
rotational mechanics, which his supplemental accident reconstruction report 
identified as including the formula w = --)2FhO/I. (Trial Tr., Vol. II, p.891, L.i5 -
p.892, L.20; R. Ex., pp.767-771.) Daily testified that such a speed change would 
have resulted in more extensive damage to the vehicles he observed in admitted 
exhibit photos. (Trial Tr., Vol. II, p.892, L.21 - p.893, L.6.) 
In the excerpt from Daily's textbook, Fundamentals of Traffic Crash 
Reconstruction, w = --)2FhOIl is identified as Equation 9.67. (R. Ex., p.774.) 
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Example 9.14 in the textbook describes a Honda Accord striking the center of the 
rear duals of a stationary semi-trailer combination at a right angle. (ld.) In the 
example, the degree of the rotation of the semi-trailer around the king-pin is 
known (4.27 degrees), and Equation 9.67 is utilized to determine w, the angular 
velocity. (R. Ex., pp.770, 774-775.) With the angular velocity known, another 
equation is utilized to compute the t.v of the Honda. (R. Ex., pp.775-776.) With 
the t.v of the Honda known, a third equation is utilized to compute the impact 
speed. (R. Ex., p.776.) At the conclusion of this final calculation of impact 
speed, the textbook contains an excerpt which reads: 
The analysis just presented was for a perpendicular crash. If 
the striking vehicle comes in at an angle different than 90°, then the 
force acting to create the torque must be adjusted by a factor 
defined as the sine of the angle of incidence. As the angle gets 
more shallow (Le., close to zero), then the solution becomes very 
sensitive to the angle and the presence of ground forces. It is 
recommended not to attempt this type of analysis for collisions that 
are less than 45°. 
(R., Ex. p.948.) 
Thus, while the textbook "recommended not to attempt" the "type of 
analysis" regarding impact speed conducted in Example 9.14 where an accident 
impact occurs at less than 45°, it did not expressly state that Equation 9.67 itself 
could never be utilized in such an instance, let alone when conducting an 
analysis under the circumstances of the BlazerlSubaru impact, where the goal 
was to determine the "speed change" necessary to rotate a vehicle a certain 
number of degrees. 
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In a sworn affidavit submitted in support of the state's objection to 
Ellington's motion for a new trial, Daily distinguished Example 9.14 from the 
BlazerlSubaru impact: 
Further, Mr. Rochford alleges the wrong formula was used to 
evaluate the impact of the Blazer-Subaru collision. However, Mr. 
Rochford bases his assessment on a formula used to compute 
impact speed. Fundamentals of Traffic Crash Reconstruction, p. 
308, Plaintiff's Exhibit 5.A. He fails to understand that the speed 
change calculation I made was not of an impact speed. Rather, the 
calculation is of the speed change that will provide enough force to 
rotate the vehicle from one angle to another. Supplementary Report 
calculations, pp. 1-3, Plaintiff's Exhibit 4. 
(R. Ex., pp.696-697.) 
At the hearing on the motion for the new trial, Daily, under oath, stood by 
his calculations and trial testimony. (4/24/12 Tr., pA5, L.25 - p.81, L.7.) Daily 
distinguished Example 9.14 in his textbook from the analysis he conducted on 
the BlazerlSubaru collision, and expressed that an attempt to compare the two 
was like "trying to mix apples and oranges." (4/24112 Tr., p.53, L.20 - p.54, 
L.12.) Example 9.14, Daily explained, was based on an experiment he set up, in 
which the semi-trailer was designed to rotate not around the center of its mass, 
like the Blazer did, but around its king-pin. (4/24/12 Tr., p.57, Ls.8-24.) In the 
case of a collision such as the BlazerlSubaru impact, Daily explained, if the 
impact came in at some other angle than 90 degrees, he would simply have to 
calculate the length of the "lever arm," which he explained to be the force that 
causes the rotation, which exists between the collision impact and the center of 
mass of the vehicle. (4/24112 Tr., p.54, Ls.13-25.) Daily did make such an 
adjustment in this case, and estimated the lever arm in the BlazerlSubaru 
collision to be two feet. (4/24112 Tr., p.58, Ls.3-10.) 
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Had Ellington attempted to make this challenge to Daily's testimony at 
trial, he may have also been hindered by the comparative qualifications of Daily 
and defense expert David Rochford, who testified at the hearing on the motion 
for a new trial. Daily has owned a traffic crash reconstruction and teaching 
company for close to 30 years and has a master's degree in mechanical 
engineering and a background in calculus and physics. (Trial Tr., Vol. II, p.849, 
L.10 - p.851, L.10.) Daily authored or co-authored three textbooks on accident 
reconstruction and is a frequent presenter, teacher, and writer on topics related 
to the field. (R. Ex., pp.680-692.) While defense expert Rochford was an 
experienced accident reconstructionist, he does not possess a math or science 
degree, and had only actually utilized rotational mechanics once. (4/24/12 Tr., 
p.31, L.11 - p.37, L.11.) 
Further, Daily did not rely exclusively on the rotational mechanics formula 
in making his determination that the Blazer did not rotate so severely as to bring 
it into an unavoidable collision course with the Honda. This determination was 
also supported by evidence observed at the scene of the incident. Daily testified 
about tire marks around the Blazer which indicated that it completed a "turning 
movement with acceleration" following its impact with the Subaru. (Trial Tr., Vol. 
II, p.878, L.23 - p.880, L.20; p.893, L.7 - p.894, L.3; p.911, L.24 - p.913, L.11.) 
He also identified the lack of "scrub marks" on the vehicles, which would tend to 
indicate that the impact between the Blazer and the Subaru was not severe 
enough to cause one vehicle to displace another and change its direction. (Trial 
Tr., Vol. II, p.881, Ls.2-19; p.888, L.12 - p.889, L.1; p.891, Ls.8-14.) Daily also 
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observed only minor damage on both vehicles, which implied a slow-speed 
collision, which he did not expect would have changed the motion of the Blazer 
"in any significant way." (Trial Tr., Vol. II, p.882, L.10 - p.884, L.12; p.887, L.3 -
p.889, L.1.) 
Finally, and unlike in Ellington I, there was no defense expert testimony at 
the second trial presenting an alternative theory that that jury may have 
gravitated towards if Ellington had convinced them to place less weight on Daily's 
testimony. Even in the context of the motion for a new trial, in support of which 
Ellington submitted documentation from two experts criticizing Daily's 
calculations, Ellington appears to have never offered his own contrary 
calculations and conclusions regarding the rotation of the Blazer. (R. Ex., 
pp.865-868; see also Appellant's brief, pp.14-15.) 
Ellington cannot show that if he had been able to cross-examine Daily with 
the textbook excerpts, that the jury would have "probably" both rejected Daily's 
explanation for any apparent inconsistency, and also have ultimately acquitted 
Ellington of the charged crimes. Because Ellington has failed to show that any 
evidence regarding excerpts of Daily's textbook would "probably produce an 
acquittal," he has failed to show that the district court abused its discretion in 
concluding that Ellington failed to satisfy the corresponding prong of the Drapeau 
standard. 
Ellington has failed to show the district court abused its discretion in 
denying his motion for a new trial based on evidence disclosed by the state prior 
to trial which, he asserts, in hindsight, he would have used to attempt to impeach 
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the state's reconstruction expert. This Court must therefore affirm the district 
court's order denying Ellington's motion for a new trial. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the district court's 
denial of Ellington's motion for a new trial. 
DATED this 6th day of November, 2013. 
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